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Social Security Incentives, 
Exit from the Workforce, 
and Entry of the Young
Michele Boldrin, Pilar García-  Gómez, and 
Sergi Jiménez-  Martín
9.1    Introduction
Beginning in the late 1970s, Spain has witnessed dramatic social, economic, 
and demographic changes. Life expectancy has increased substantially, and 
fertility rates have dropped to some of the lowest levels in the European 
Union (EU). The Spanish public system of social insurance, of which the 
public pension system (Seguridad Social) is the main component, underwent 
a major reform in the middle 1980s and is now substantially more compre-
hensive and generous than it used to be. Finally, Spanish per capita income 
has grown continuously since the middle 1980s, on average at about a percent-
age point faster than the rest of the EU, and the growth has been compara-
tively higher since the late 1990s. During the same period, a large share of 
the older workers population have been dismissed and lead to retire earlier, 
while the population unemployment rate soared ﬁ  rst and then, since 1996, 
declined steadily to reach average European levels in the last three years.
Quite often during the last three decades, policies that favor early retire-
ment are supported and promoted with the justiﬁ  cation that they may induce 
a reduction in youth unemployment rates. The basic idea is that because jobs 
are a scarce resource available in a ﬁ  xed number, retiring an older worker 
would “free” the same job for a younger, most likely unemployed, one. 
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We have found a number of references to this issue in the press during the 
early eighties. Just as an example, we mention the preamble of the national 
employment agreement of 1981 (Acuerdo nacional sobre empleo; El País, 
July 6, 1981) describing a special retirement scheme (Sistema especial de 
jubilaciones):1
Las partes ﬁ  rmantes del acuerdo han examinado los posibles efectos sobre 
el empleo del establecimiento de un sistema que permita la jubilación con 
el 100% de los derechos pasivos de los trabajadores al cumplir 64 años de 
edad y la simultánea contratación por parte de las empresas de trabaja-
dores jóvenes o perceptores del Seguro de Desempleo en número igual al 
de las jubilaciones anticipadas que se pacten con contratos de igual natu-
raleza que los que se sustituyen. El Gobierno elaborará, en el plazo de 2 
meses, una norma estableciendo la regulación de un sistema que, por la vía 
de los convenios colectivos o del acuerdo entre empresas y trabajadores, 
permita las sustituciones a que se reﬁ  ere el párrafo anterior.
[The signed parties of the agreement have examined the possible eﬀects 
on employment of a system that allows retirement with 100 percent of the 
liability rights of the workers when they become sixty-  four years old and 
the simultaneous hiring from the ﬁ  rm of young workers or receivers of 
unemployment beneﬁ  ts with contracts of the same nature as the ones to be 
substituted in equal number as the early retirees agreed. The Government 
will devise, in a two months period, a rule establishing the regulation of 
a system that, via collective agreements or agreement between employers 
and employees, allows the substitutions referred above.] 
In fact, the 1985 pension system reform, which gave shape to the system 
currently in place,2 introduced several speciﬁ  c programs to favor the substi-
tution of older by younger workers. Especially relevant are the Jubilación 
Especial (special retirement scheme) at age sixty- four and the Jubilación Par-
cial (partial retirement). The ﬁ  rst one has been always very marginal, with 
an incidence varying from 1 to 4 percent of the total number of retirees. The 
second has not been used until very recent years, after the 2002 reform. In 
fact, the incidence of this scheme was negligible until 2002. Since then, it has 
increased very rapidly (4.24 percent in 2002 and 13.27 percent in 2007). See 
table 9A.1 for recent information about the distribution of the retirement 
pensions awarded in recent years. Unfortunately, a large share of this time 
period is out of our sample and cannot be taken into consideration.
1. Other mentions of the issue can be found in International Labor Organization (ILO) 
documents (Medidas de la OIT para luchar contra el desempleo. El Pais, 17/08/1982. http://
www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/PAISES_INDUSTRIALIZADOS/ORGANIZA
CION_INTERNACIONAL_DEL_TRABAJO_/OIT/Medidas/OIT/luchar/paro/elpepieco/
19820817elpepieco_10/Tes; also in an article on El País (Artículo de opinión en El País 
26/11/1983 de Daniel Gil. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/edad/jubilaciones/elpepiopi/
19831126elpepiopi_10/Tes. More recently, in 2002, we have found another reference to the issue 
in Trade unions news: http://www.ugtrioja.org/web/actualidad/cp/cp219.htm.
2. There have been three reforms after 1985: 1997, 2002, and 2007. However, the shape of 
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Our goal is to understand the relationship between the employment (or 
exit from the labor force) of the old and the employment/unemployment of 
the young. To do this, we ﬁ  rst estimate the statistical impact of the labor 
force participation (LFP) of the old on the employment/unemployment of 
the young, and also of the middle- aged individuals. However, changes in the 
LFP of the old may be due to factors other than changes in pension incen-
tives, which may also be correlated with the labor conditions of the young, 
thus giving biased estimates. Therefore, one would like to estimate the direct 
eﬀect of retirement policies.
More precisely, we would like to estimate at the aggregate level the direct 
relationship between the incentive for the old to leave the labor force and 
the employment of the young. In order to do so, we need a simple aggregate 
indicator of the incentive to retire. However, to obtain such an index may 
be complicated, especially recognizing the need to account for some key 
aspects of the inducement to retire: the eligibility age, the beneﬁ  t level given 
eligibility, and the change in the beneﬁ  t if the receipt of beneﬁ  ts is delayed 
(the option value/peak value [OV/PV] idea, essentially the actuarial adjust-
ment if retirement is delayed); and the necessity to aggregate them for all 
the individuals “at risk” in a given year.
Methodologically, our approach is very simple: we collect time series 
information of the main indicators of the Spanish labor market for the key 
groups of the population; in parallel, we construct synthetic incentive mea-
sures for the at risk population in a given year. To do this, we combine data 
from the Spanish Labor Force Survey and the Muestra Continua de Vidas 
Laborales (MCVL2006).
Previous works on the relationship between employment of the young and 
exit of older workers in Spain (Jiménez-  Martín 1999) and Europe (Boldrin 
et al. 1999) have found no systematic evidence of any signiﬁ  cant correlation. 
Jiménez- Martín (1999) analyzes the relationship between young’s entry and 
older’s exit from the labor market in Spain using data from the panel data 
version of the Spanish Labor Force Survey in the 1987 to 1997 period. He 
analyzes the individual decision to enter the labor market (transitions into 
the “market”) while controlling for individual and household characteris-
tics as well as local market indicators. Among the latter, he highlights the 
fraction/amount of exit from the labor market on the part of older individu-
als, especially those aged ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four. He ﬁ  nds little evidence of 
any relationship between entry of the young and exit of older individuals.
Boldrin et al. (1999) collected various labor market observations for a 
sample of 260 Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) II 
and NUTS III European regions over the years 1986, 1991, and 1996.3 They 
expect that, if any eﬀect is visible, it should be detectable at this level of 
3. They represent relatively small areas, which happen to be the territorial units at which the 
European Commission targets its employment policies and for which national governments 
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geographical disaggregation. Figures 2 and 3 in Boldrin et al. (1999) plot, 
separately for men and women, the relationship between the exit rates from 
the labor force of people born between 1931 and 1940, and the changes in 
the unemployment rates over 1991 to 1996 of people aged between twenty-
 one and thirty. Under the substitution hypothesis, we should expect a nega-
tive relationship. Neither for men nor for women, the estimated regression 
lines turn out to be signiﬁ  cantly negatively sloped. For alternative speci-
ﬁ  cations, controlling for cohort eﬀects or using diﬀerent lags, the results 
hardly change. Thus, they conclude that early retirement of older workers 
does not come together with a reduction of unemployment among younger 
people.
The rest of this document goes as follows. In section 9.2, we document the 
main macroeconomic facts of the last decades. In section 9.3, we describe the 
social security background. Data and sources are commented in section 9.4. 
In section 9.5, we discuss the trends of the labor force during the period of 
study. In section 9.6 we present the methodology and the construction of the 
inducement-  to-  retire measure and, in section 9.7, the empirical framework 
used to test the relevant hypothesis. The empirical results are described in 
section 9.8. Finally, section 9.9 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
9.2    The  Facts
9.2.1    Macroeconomic  Context
Table 9.1 summarizes the Spanish macroeconomic evolution, in relation 
to the EU’s average, since 1975. The basic facts for Spain are as follows.4 In 
the period immediately after the oil shock, 1975 to 1985, which coincides 
with the death of Francisco Franco and the beginning of the democratic 
transition, both the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate and the level 
of employment were well below the European average. This period cor-
responds to a dramatic “structural transition” in which a few million jobs 
were eliminated and the unemployment rate skyrocketed to levels substan-
tially above 20 percent. This was only partially a consequence of the two 
oil shocks; the collapse of the Franco regime led to a spontaneous and 
unplanned “opening” of the economy, which preceded and anticipated the 
entrance into the EU by almost a decade. As a consequence of this broad 
restructuring process, productivity growth in Spain was by far more intense 
than the European average until the second half of the 1980s. In the period 
since 1985, the opposite happened: productivity growth in Spain is slightly 
but persistently below the EU average, while GDP and employment grow, 
on average, faster than in the rest of Europe. The last thirteen years, in 
particular, have seen a spectacular increase in Spanish employment (more 
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than eight million additional jobs out of a total employment, in 1995, of 
about twelve million), which has, nevertheless, come together with a very 
slow rate of growth in labor productivity. Inﬂ  ation, on the other hand, has 
been slightly above the European average during the whole period, although 
the diﬀerential has been reduced in recent years, following the implemen-
tation ﬁ  rst of the Maastricht pact and then of the Euro. Finally, real unit 
labor costs have been decreasing at about the EU average during the whole 
period.
What are the implications of these macroeconomic facts for our purposes? 
Basically, that the relative economic position of Spain, and of the average 
Spaniard, has improved substantially, vis-  á-  vis that of the average Euro-
pean, during the last thirty years. The natural question to ask, therefore, 
is: did this improvement in the economic well being of the average Span-
iard translates also into an improvement of the economic conditions of the 
elderly? Figure 9.1 reports the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP since 
1965. It is apparent that this ratio has grown substantially for about thirty 
years and has ﬂ  attened out and then slightly decreased during the last ten 
years or so.
9.2.2      Labor Market Reforms since the 1970s
There have been substantial changes in employment protection legislation 
over the last three decades. The following chronology describes the major 
ones:
Fig. 9.1    Pension expenditure to GDP ratioSocial Security Incentives, Exit from Workforce, and Entry of the Young    2 6 7
￿   1978: Following the transition to democracy, Spain introduced labor 
legislation restricting dismissals and adding high dismissal costs.5
￿    1980: The parliament passed the Workers’ Statute including the Strike 
and Collective Bargaining regulation. At the same time, early retirement 
provisions and the notion of “disability due to economic reasons” are 
introduced.
￿    1984: First reform of the labor market with the objective of reducing 
dismissal cost. Temporary contracts are introduced that became very 
popular since (as shown in table 9.2). As a result of the 1984 reform, the 
proportion of employees under temporary contracts increased from 10 
percent during the 1980s to over 30 percent in the early 1990s. The tem-
porary contracts generated a dual labor market: unstable low-  paying 
jobs and stable high-  paying jobs under the old regulation. It did not 
reduce unemployment until the recovery of 1994 (Kugler, Jimeno, and 
Hernanz 2002). Not surprisingly, reducing ﬁ  ring costs has been one of 
the recurrent recommendations of national and international organiza-
tions, although actual reforms had only a limited scope (Organization 
for Economics Cooperation and Development [OECD] (2005).
￿    1994: Second major reform of the labor market, with the objective of 
introducing limitations to the use of temporary contracts.
￿   1997: Third important reform of the labor market (actualized in 2001). 
The purpose of this reform was to further limiting the incentive to use 
temporary contracts by reducing dismissal cost of certain groups of 
workers. The most noted aspect of the reform was the introduction 
of a new permanent contract, with reduced severance payments. This 
contract was targeted to two groups: the population most exposed to 
unemployment (i.e., the youth, the long- term unemployed, and women 
and men above age forty- ﬁ  ve) and workers on a temporary contract who 
5. This legislation established that ﬁ  rms could dismiss workers for “personal reasons,” in 
which case the ﬁ  rm had to prove the worker’s incompetence or absenteeism, and “economic 
reasons,” in which case the ﬁ  rm had to prove its need to reduce employment due to technologi-
cal, organizational, or productive causes. Dismissals justiﬁ  ed by “economic reasons” required 
advance notice. Workers dismissed for “personal reasons” could appeal to labor courts. The sev-
erance payment awarded depended on whether judges ruled the dismissal as “fair” or “unfair.” 
A dismissal was ruled as “fair” if the employer was able to prove the worker’s incompetence 
or absenteeism and “unfair” otherwise. In case of fair dismissals, ﬁ  rms had to pay twenty 
days out of the salary per year of seniority, with a maximum of twelve months. In the case of 
unfair dismissals, ﬁ  rms had to pay forty- ﬁ  ve days per year of seniority out of the salary, with a 
maximum of forty-  two months. Severance payments for “economic reasons” were the same as 
for fair dismissals under “personal reasons.” In practice, this legislation turned out to be very 
stringent because judges ruled dismissals as unfair in the majority of cases. Moreover, approval 
for dismissals under “economic reasons” was often granted only when there was an agreement 
between employers and workers, which was achieved in most cases by raising severance pay-
ments above the legally established amounts. The Spanish government introduced the ﬁ  rst 
reform designed to reduce dismissal costs in 1984. Because an across-  the-  board reduction of 
dismissal costs was politically impossible, the reform liberalized the use of temporary contracts 
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converted to an indeﬁ  nite one during the one- year period following the 
approval of the new legislation.
￿   2006: Fourth important labor market reform. Previous reforms had 
failed to reduce the fraction of temporary contracts; a new attempt was 
made by introducing strong restrictions on the extension of contracts 
or replacement of temporary workers.
9.2.3      Background on the Spanish Social Security System
Mandatory insurance for job related accidents was introduced in 1900, 
through a bill that also authorized the creation of some funds, for public 
employees only, paying disability and retirement pensions. In 1919, manda-
tory retirement insurance (Retiro Obrero Obligatorio) was introduced for 
private- sector employees aged sixteen to sixty- ﬁ  ve whose total annual salary 
was below a certain threshold. In 1926, a universal pension system for public 
employees (Régimen de Clases Pasivas, or RCP) was established, which still 
exists under the same name. By the late 1930s, most Spanish employees were 
covered, in one form or another, by some minimal, government mandatory 
retirement insurance program.
With the end of the Republic and the advent of Franco’s regime, a number 
of changes were implemented. In 1939, Workers’ Retirement (Retiro Obrero) 
was replaced by Old Age Insurance (Seguro de Vejez). While the former 
was based upon a capitalization system, the latter was from the beginning 
a completely unfunded pay-  as-  you-  go scheme. By 1950, the system had 
acquired its basic organization in two pillars, which remained essentially 
unchanged until the mid 1970s. Public servants were all covered by the RCP, 
while private-  sector employees with annual earnings below a certain ceiling 
were covered by the Old Age Insurance. The 1963 reform created a very 
large number of special funds (Régimenes Especiales) next to the general 
scheme (Régimen General), generating a jungle of special treatments that is 
still being dismantled.
In 1977, a reform bill made a ﬁ  rst attempt at harmonizing the many exist-
ing funds, by reducing the diﬀerences in the treatment they oﬀered and by 
putting (in 1979) the administration of the whole system under the newly 
created National Social Security Institute (Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad 
Social, or INSS). Overall, this process increased the percentage of workers 
covered by the public social security system.
The key rules before the 1985 reform (see Barrada [1999] or Boldrin, 
Jiménez-  Martín, and Peracchi [1999] for a complete description) were the 
following:
1.  The Normal Retirement Age is set at sixty-  ﬁ  ve and the Early Retire-
ment Age, for those that started contributing before 1967, at sixty.
2.  Eligibility: ten years of contributions, of which two years should be in 
the last seven years preceding the date of retirement.270        Michele Boldrin, Pilar García-Gómez, and Sergi Jiménez-Martín
3.  Amount of pension: 50 percent of the “beneﬁ  t base” with ten years of 
contributions, plus 2 percent for each additional year of contributions, up 
to 100 percent with thirty-  ﬁ  ve years.
The reform process, which came to shape the current regime, introduced a 
few important changes: eligibility criteria for disability pensions were tight-
ened; the minimum number of years of contributions required to obtain 
an old-  age pension was increased from eight to ﬁ  fteen; and the number of 
years entering the computation of the beneﬁ  t base was increased from two 
to eight. On June 26, 1997, many of the parameters used for the computation 
of beneﬁ  t bases and pensions were modiﬁ  ed. The number of contributory 
years over which the beneﬁ  t base is computed was increased from eight to 
ﬁ  fteen (by year 2001). The formula for the computation of the replacement 
rate   (see the following) was also made less generous, whereas the 8 per-
cent per-  year penalty applied to early retirees between the ages of sixty and 
sixty- ﬁ   ve  was  reduced  to  7  percent  for  those  individuals  with  forty  or  more 
contributory years at the time of retirement.
Currently, the Spanish social security oﬀers two pathways to regular 
retirement:6 early retirement and normal retirement. Early retirement is 
possible starting at age sixty, while the normal retirement age is sixty-  ﬁ  ve, 
although some professional groups have lower normal retirement ages (min-
ers, military personnel, policemen, and ﬁ  shermen are the main ones). Col-
lective wage settlements often impose mandatory retirement at age sixty- ﬁ  ve, 
facilitate retirement at sixty-  four with full beneﬁ  ts, or encourage retirement 
between sixty and sixty-  three through lump-  sum payments.
Public pensions are provided by the following programs:
￿   The “General Social Security Scheme” (Régimen General de la Segu-
ridad Social, or RGSS) and the “Special Social Security Schemes for 
Self- Employed”  (Régimen Especial de Trabajadores Autónomos, or 
RETA). They cover, respectively, the private-  sector employees and the 
self-  employed workers and professionals. The RGSS covers also the 
members of cooperative ﬁ  rms, the employees of most public adminis-
trations other than the central governments, and all unemployed indi-
viduals complying with the minimum number of contributory years 
when reaching sixty-  ﬁ  ve.
￿    The scheme for government employees (Régimen de Clases Pasivas, or 
RCP) includes public servants employed by the central government and 
its local branches.
In what follows, we provide a brief summary of key regulatory changes in 
the Spanish social security system.
6. That is to say, in the absence of disability or long-  term unemployment in late age.Social Security Incentives, Exit from Workforce, and Entry of the Young    2 7 1
￿    1973: Social Security Act: Introduction of the tax base (not linked to 
wages) but to categories.
￿   1974: Social Security Bill: Eﬀectively linked the tax base to wages. Loos-
ened signiﬁ  cantly the eligibility criteria. Common replacement rates.
￿    1977: Harmonization Process: Caused a signiﬁ  cant increase of cover-
age.
￿   1985: First major pension system reform. It included restrictions in the 
access to invalidity very frequent in the period 1980 to 1985. It intro-
duced several Early Retirement programs: Jubilación Parcial, Jubilación 
Flexible, and Jubilación Especial a los 64. Consistent increase of the 
Minimum Pension to the Minimum Wage since then.
￿    1997: Second Pension Reform. Following the Toledo Pact (1995). Very 
little eﬀect on either incentives or pension expenditure.
￿   2002: Third Pension Reform. Early Retirement up to sixty-  one (but 
not aﬀecting current workers). Very little eﬀect on either incentives or 
pension expenditure in the short run. The incentives to use the partial 
retirement program were increased, and this program has been increas-
ingly used as an exit route.
￿    2007: Fourth Pension Reform (Ley 40/2007). Marginal changes on eli-
gibility for retirement options. Important changes on eligibility (change 
to ﬁ  fteen years or 5.475 days of eﬀective contributions), conditions for 
allowing for partial retirement, and formula for disability insurance 
(DI) beneﬁ  ts.
See the appendix for a detailed description of the system rules from 1985 
onward.
9.3      Description of Data and Sources
We start by providing an index of the data sets that are currently avail-
able. One important limitation should be noticed: there is no single data set 
covering the whole period 1975 to 2005. Most time series, therefore, will be 
constructed by splining data from diﬀerent sources, creating obvious prob-
lems of consistency, which, while less dramatic than one might expect, are 
nevertheless substantial.
9.3.1    Data  Sources
Employment
Data about employment and labor force participation come from the 
Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA). The EPA is a rotating quarterly survey 
carried out by the Spanish National Statistical Institute (Instituto Nacio-
nal de Estadística, INE). The planned sample size consists of about 64,000 272        Michele Boldrin, Pilar García-Gómez, and Sergi Jiménez-Martín
households with approximately 150,000 adult individuals. Although the sur-
vey has been conducted since 1964, publicly released cross-  sectional ﬁ  les 
are available only from 1977. The 1977 questionnaire was modiﬁ  ed in 1987 
(when a set of retrospective questions was introduced) and again in the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of 1992. In both cases, the lengthening of the questionnaire led to 
increased nonresponse rates. Further modiﬁ  cations have been introduced 
in 1999 and 2004.
The EPA provides fairly detailed information on labor force status, edu-
cation, and family background variables but, as with most European-  style 
labor force surveys, no information on earnings and other sources of income. 
The reference period for most questions is the week before the interview.
Wage Proﬁ  les and Incentive Variables
Both wage proﬁ  les and monetary incentive variables are constructed using 
data from: (a) Historiales Laborales de la Seguridad Social, 1998 (old ver-
sion): a sample of about 250,000 of working careers (Social Security num-
bers) taken at the end of 1997 (See Boldrin, Jiménez-  Martín, and Peracchi 
2001, 2004) for a description); complete working histories up to 1998 and 
monthly covered wages for employees in the 1986 to 1995, which allows us to 
construct year of birth   gender   region wage proﬁ  les and, thus, incentives. 
(b) Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL2006): a sample of about 
1,000,000 of working careers (Social Security numbers) taken at the end of 
2005; complete working histories up to 2006 and monthly covered wages for 
employees in the 1980 to 2005 period, which allows us to construct year of 
birth   gender   region wage proﬁ  les and, thus, incentives.
9.3.2      Labor Force Trends from 1977 to 2005
In this section, we present some descriptive and graphical evidence on 
labor force trends by gender for the groups under study. We also show a 
ﬁ  rst glimpse of the relationship between the labor status of the diﬀerent 
groups and the diﬀerent labor and social security reforms. Figure 9.2 shows 
the evolution of the labor force participation, the employment rate, and the 
unemployment rate for the population aged sixteen to sixty-  nine by gen-
der. It can be seen that there has been an important increase in the female 
labor force participation since the mid-  1980s, while the employment and 
unemployment rate of both males and females have been moved in parallel, 
decreasing (increasing) the employment (unemployment) rate during the 
mid- 1980s, and an increase (decrease) in employment (unemployment) rates 
after the mid-  1990s.
Figures 9.3 and 9.4 present some data to set the stage. They show how 
the employment and unemployment rate of the youth and the prime age 
individuals relate to the labor force participation of the older group (ﬁ  fty-
 ﬁ  v e   t o   s i x t y -  n i n e )   a n d   w h e t h e r   t h e   l a b o r   m a r k e t   o r   s o c i a l   s e c u r i t y   r e f o r m s  
can play any role. The employment and unemployment ﬁ  gures of young Fig. 9.2    Labor market trends by gender
Fig. 9.3    Labor market trends of old and young individuals and labor and 
pension reforms
Fig. 9.4    Relationship of young and prime age individuals labor market outcomes 
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and prime age individuals behave similarly during the observational period 
independently on whether we deﬁ  ne young individuals to be younger than 
twenty- ﬁ   ve  or  thirty.  However,  the  unemployment  rate  of  young  individu-
als is always higher. At the same time, the ﬁ  gures show that there is no clear 
association between the labor force participation of the older group and 
the employment or unemployment of the other two groups. Moreover, the 
observed changes in this association are hard to relate with any speciﬁ  c 
policy change.
To highlight the importance of employment and unemployment for the 
labor force participation of older workers, ﬁ  gures 9.5, 9.6, and 9.7 show 
the labor force participation, the employment rate, and the unemployment 
rate for four diﬀerent age groups by gender. The behavior of both the labor 
force participation and the employment rate is more stable during the period 
than the unemployment rate. We observe a decrease in both the LFP and the 
employment rate of individuals aged older than sixty, and a slight increase 
of the same measures for women aged ﬁ  fty to ﬁ  fty-  four.
On the other hand, there has also been an important increase on the 
schooling rates of the Spanish population during the period under study. 
Figure 9.5 shows the percentage of individuals aged twenty to twenty-  four 
who are unemployed, employed, or in school. First notice that the total 
amount can exceed 100 percent as there can be some individuals who are 
either employed or unemployed while in school. It can be appreciated that 
while there has been a decrease in the percentage of young individuals in 
Fig. 9.5    Labor and schooling trends of young individuals in Spain, 1977–2006Social Security Incentives, Exit from Workforce, and Entry of the Young    2 7 5
unemployment and an increase in the percentage in employment, the biggest 
change can be seen in the percentage of individuals who declare being still 
at school, as it increases from less than 20 percent at the beginning of the 
period to over 40 percent in the last years.
9.4    Regressions
As stated before, the main purpose of this paper is to analyze the link 
between employment for the young and retirement from the labor force of 
the elderly population, and, in particular, the link between employment of 
the young and pension system regulations. Following an independent vari-
able (IV) approach, we want to establish whether social security reforms have 
been set with the purpose to increase availability of jobs for the young and, 
of course, whether they have been successful.
We begin with ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of labor mar-
ket outcomes for nonelderly on labor market outcomes of the “old.” With 
the purpose to examine as broadly as possible the relationship between 
LFP of the old and employment of the nonold fraction of the popula-
tion, we consider the following ﬁ  ve dependent variables: Unemployment 
and Employment for prime age (individuals aged twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four) 
and Unemployment, Employment, and Schooling for the youth (individu-
als aged twenty to twenty- four). The independent variable is the LFP of the 
old workers (individuals aged ﬁ  fty-  six to sixty-  four). And all the variables 
are expressed as rates over total population of the relevant age group. We 
consider two versions of such regressions: levels and diﬀerences of order 5. 
Let us ﬁ  rst introduce the levels regression:
Yt        LFPOt    Xt   εt,
where Y denotes either Employment, Unemployment, or Schooling, and X 
is a set of economic controls (per capita GDP, GDP growth, and share of 
manufacturing in GDP) in order to control for labor market characteristics 
associated with both LFP of the old and employment or unemployment of 
either young or prime age individuals. The ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerences equation to 
be estimated is analogous, but both independent and dependent variables 
are expressed as a ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerence.
In summary, for each dependent variable, we carry out the following exer-
cises: levels and diﬀerences; two age groups (young and prime age), with and 
without the selected covariates.
9.5      Measures of Retirement Incentives
However, as stated in the introduction, there can be some further labor 
market conditions beyond social security incentives that can aﬀect both 
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unemployment situation of either young or prime age workers. In order 
to solve this limitation, we construct a synthetic measure of the incentives 
faced by older workers.
The purpose of this section is to present the methodology and the assump-
tions made to construct a synthetic measure of the (monetary or ﬁ  nancial) 
inducement to retirement that the population at retirement risk faces. That is 
we want to have an aggregate measure of the strength with which the social 
security spells out representative workers from the labor force. We want this 
index to account for the various factors inﬂ  uencing retirement decisions: the 
eligibility age, the beneﬁ  t level given eligibility, and the change in the beneﬁ  t 
if the receipt of beneﬁ  ts is delayed (the idea of the OV (Stock and Wise 1990) 
and the PV (Coile and Gruber 2000), essentially the actuarial adjustment 
if retirement is delayed). In order to do so, we ﬁ  rst present the standard 
monetary incentives measures (Gruber and Wise 1999). Then we present the 
synthetic indicator(s) and the assumptions made in computations.
9.5.1      Social Security Incentives Measures
For a (representative) worker of age a, following Gruber and Wise (1999), 
we deﬁ  ne social security wealth (SSW) in case of retirement at age b   a as 
the expected present value of future pension beneﬁ  ts:




Here S is the age of certain death,  s    s–a s, with   denoting the pure 
time discount factor and  s the conditional survival probability at age s for 
an individual alive at age a, and Bs(h) the pension expected at age s   h   1 
in case of retirement at age s.
Given SSW, we deﬁ  ne three incentive variables for a worker of age a: the 
accrual at horizon 1 (SSA), the implicit tax/subsidy rate (TAX), the opti-
mal horizontal peak value (PV), and the option value (OV). The deﬁ  nition 
of these incentive measures, for an individual of age t   55, . . . , 69 are as 
follows:
￿    Accrual at horizon 1: SSAt   sswt 1 – sswt.
￿   Implicit tax/subsidy rate: TAXt   SSAt/Et(wt 1), where Et is the expecta-
tion operator based upon the information available up to time t.
￿    Accrual at the optimal horizon h∗ or peak value: PVt   maxh(sswt h) 
– sswt, h   1, . . . , R – t, where R is the mandatory retirement age (the 
latter does not exist in Spain, but given the retirement evidence, we ﬁ  nd 
it reasonable to assume that R   70).
￿   Option Value OVa   maxh(Vh – Va), h   a   1, . . . , R, where
  Vh =  sWs
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and ps is the survival probability, S is age of (certain) death, W stands 
for earnings, and B stands for pension beneﬁ  ts.
We have imposed that     .97,     1, and k   1.25. Note that under these 
assumptions:




9.5.2      A Summary Measure of the Incentive to Retire
To obtain such an index can become somewhat complicated, especially 
recognizing the need to account for the key aspects of the inducement to 
retire: the age of eligibility, the beneﬁ  t level given eligibility, and the change 
in the beneﬁ  t if the receipt of beneﬁ  ts is delayed (the OV/PV idea, essentially 
the actuarial adjustment if retirement is delayed). Here, we consider the 
development of a summary measure of the inducement to retire. We begin 
with a suggested summary measure of the inducement implicit in the present 
value of social security beneﬁ  ts. Then we discuss how this sort of measure 
might be extended to develop a single summary measure that incorporates 
each of the three aspects of the inducement to retire.
We will be using the incentive measure in time series regressions, so we 
need to think about the inducement to retire with respect to all older per-
sons who are out of the labor force in a given year. We will consider several 
alternatives.
First, we want to summarize the SSW faced by persons who are out of 
the labor force in year t. For simplicity, we assume a rather narrow age range 
for illustration, but the actual age range could be much broader. Assume 
the ﬁ  rst eligibility age is ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve. Consider the “average” social security 
wealth W of all persons aged ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to R (R   70, for example) retired in 
1980. Those ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve in 1980 must have retired in 1980, and we want the W 
of ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve-  year-  olds in 1980. Those ﬁ  fty-  six in 1980 could have retired at 
ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve in 1979 or at ﬁ  fty-  six in 1980, so we need W(55, 1979) and W(56, 
1980). And we need to weight these wealth numbers by q(55, 1979) and q(56, 
1980), where q measures the odds of exposure to those retirement incentives 
at each age/year. Those ﬁ  fty-  seven in 1980 could have retired at ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve in 
1978, or ﬁ  fty-  six in 1979, or at ﬁ  fty-  seven in 1980. So we need W(55, 1978), 
W(56, 1979), and W(57, 1980). And we need to weight these wealth numbers 
by q(55, 1978), q(56, 1979), and q(57, 1980), respectively.
So, in general, when we consider all feasible retirement ages,






























where R   64, P(a, y) is the proportion of retired persons at age a in year y 
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9.5.3      A More General Inducement Measure
The disadvantage of the approach laid out in the preceding is that it cap-
tures only one of the three aspects of the inducement to retire (the beneﬁ  t 
level), while ignoring two others (the ﬁ  rst eligibility age and the PV/OV). We 
would like to consider a more inclusive index that captures all three aspects 
of how social security systems aﬀect retirement as well as discounting of 
future beneﬁ  ts. The generalized inducement to retirement measure, I  is con-
structed by replacing W(a; y) in the preceding formula by:
I(a,y, )   W(a,y)    [W(a,y)   PV(a,y)],
where 0       1 is a discounting factor that may vary with age. Note that 
when     1, the same weights are given to the terms W(a,y) and W(a,y) – 
PV(a,y), and, when     0, we get the W index. Note the eligibility is taken 
into account, under borrowing constraints, by setting W(a,y) equal to zero 
for those ages in which the individual is not eligible to retirement. So, ﬁ  nally, 
we get the following formula:





























9.5.4      Assumptions Made in Incentives Calculus
We compute social security incentives for stylized individuals representing 
cohorts born between 1910 (age seventy in 1980) and 1970 (age thirty- ﬁ  ve in 
2005). In order to compute the preceding incentives, we need several ingre-
dients: wage and contributions history and family characteristics.
As regards wage and contributions history, we proceed as follows:
￿    From every year-  of-  birth and gender cohort in the ECVL2006 sample, 
we construct (when available) the median wage distribution in the 
period 1981 to 2005. For example, for the group of individuals born 
in 1940, we recover covered wages from age forty-  one to sixty-  ﬁ  ve. In 
general for individuals born in year j we recover wages from ages 1981 – j 
to 2005 – j.
￿    Given this information, we regress the observed data against age and 
its square and region.
￿    Then we predict backward and forward in order to obtain a complete 
year of birth-  gender-  region wage proﬁ  les in the twenty to seventy age 
range.
￿   We consider that the representative individual has contributed for thirty 
years at age ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve, that is, they have contributed for thirty-  ﬁ  ve years 
at sixty (the early retirement age) and forty by age sixty- ﬁ  ve (the normal 
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Regarding the family and other characteristics, we assume:
1.  For the male cohorts in sample, we initially assume that (a) they are 
married with a nonworking spouse, (b) their wife is three years younger, 
and (c) their mortality corresponds to the baseline male mortality from the 
oﬃcial data (INE 1995).
2.  For every female cohort in sample, we initially assume that (a) they are 
married with a retiree or a worker entitled to retirement beneﬁ  ts, (b) their 
husband is four years older, and (c) their mortality is the baseline female 
mortality from oﬃcial data (INE 1995).
3.  In addition, for both men and women, we assume that (d) starting at 
age ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve and until a person reaches sixty-  ﬁ  ve, there are three pathways 
into retirement: unemployment beneﬁ  ts for individuals older aged at least 
ﬁ  fty-  two (UB52 ), disability insurance (DI) and early retirement (ER). At 
each particular age, the individual has an age-  speciﬁ  c probability of going 
into retirement using any of these three programs. However, we have to take 
into account the following restrictions.
As for eligibility, we assume:
1.  A person has no access to the ER program before age sixty.
2.  After age sixty, a person cannot claim UB52  and can only claim ER 
or DI beneﬁ  ts.
Finally, the participation and employment rates, as well as the fraction 
of retirees, are obtained from the Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA) in 
the period 1977 to 2006. Moreover, we have used the relative male/female 
employment rates to build up gender-  aggregated incentive measures.
Combining Several Programs
Figure 9.6 shows the percentage of individuals aged ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-
  four that have most likely exit from the labor force, either through normal 
retirement, disability, or unemployment schemes. It can be seen that the 
percentage that exits through other routes rather than normal retirement is 
nonnegligible; thus, in order to estimate a summary measure of the incen-
tives faced by older workers in order to exit their employment, we should 
also include the incentives that come from other sources.
We would like to weigh the incentives to exit through the diﬀerent routes 
using the actual taking rates. Unfortunately, we can only observe the percent-
age of individuals that are at each state each year, so we have approximated 
the corresponding weights as follows. We have ﬁ  rst selected those individuals 
who are either employed, unemployed, or on a disability scheme. Then the 
weight assigned to SSW (normal retirement) is equal to the percentage that 
employed individuals represent on this selected population. Accordingly, 
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proportion that unemployed individuals represent on that population and 
the weight assigned to SSW (disability) as the proportion that individuals 
on a disability scheme represent on this selected population. We have fur-
ther restricted the probability of receiving unemployment SSW to zero for 
individuals older than sixty and calculate two diﬀerent indexes depending 
on whether retirement wealth was assumed to be zero earlier than the retire-
ment age.
9.5.5    Description  of  Variation
Figure 9.7 presents the time trend of the incentive variable I  assuming 
that alpha equals 2.5 under diﬀerent assumptions regarding on one hand 
the eﬀects of diﬀerent routes into retirement and on the other the value of 
pension social security wealth before the legal retirement age of sixty. The 
ﬁ  rst index (Ibar250_1) assumes that pension social security wealth before the 
age of sixty equals 0 and that there is only normal retirement as a route into 
retirement. The diﬀerent assumption in the second index (Ibar250_2) is that 
wealth before age of sixty is diﬀerent from zero. Both the third (Ibar250_3) 
and the fourth (Ibar250_4) indexes include diﬀerent routes into retirement, 
but while the third assumes that social security wealth before the age of sixty 
is equal to 0, the fourth doesn’t.
Fig. 9.6    Percentage of individuals aged ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four that declare to be re-
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9.5.6    Incentives  Regression
In addition to the relationship between the employment of the old and 
the unemployment of the young, as described in the preceding, we would 
like to estimate the direct relationship between the inducement for the old 
to leave the labor force and the employment of the young. So we add to the 
regressions the synthetic measure of the inducement to retirement. In this 
case, the model to be estimated is the following:
Yt        I t    Xt   εt
9.6    Results
We ﬁ nally come to the empirical ﬁ ndings. In order to test whether the 
old and young Spanish workers are complement or substitute, we follow a 
two- step procedure. In the ﬁ  rst step, we test if there is any direct relationship 
between the labor force participation of the old and the employment and 
unemployment levels of the young. We estimate both sets of regressions in 
levels and in ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerences, with and without covariates to control 
for the economic cycle. In the second step, we analyze how the incentives to 
retire faced by the old directly inﬂ  uence the employment outcomes of the 
young. However, before obtaining the second set of estimates, we compute 
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empirically the value of alpha to be used to weigh the two components of 
the I-  index. The analysis is carried out using data aggregated to the cells in 
the period 1977 to 2006 (N   30).
9.6.1    Direct  Eﬀects of LFP of the Old
Table 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5 report the results about the direct eﬀect of the labor 
supply of older workers on the employment outcomes of the young; the 
models have been estimated in levels and in ﬁ  fth diﬀerences. The evidence 
is mixed, although it mostly rejects the substitutability hypothesis. On the 
other hand, the complementarity hypothesis is also rejected in some speciﬁ  -
cations, especially when the full set of economic covariates is included.
On the basis of this evidence, one could argue that there exists a positive 
relationship between the labor force participation of older workers and the 
employment rate of prime age individuals, while the association between 
unemployment and labor force participation is negative. Moreover, there 
is no evidence supporting the hypothesis that old and young workers are 
substitute; if anything, they are complement.
One may argue that, in Spain, the entry into active labor market par-
ticipation takes place later than in most countries; hence, individuals aged 
twenty- ﬁ   ve to twenty- nine should be treated as “young” and not considered 
within the prime age group. In order to test the sensitivity of our results to 
age grouping, we have replicated the analysis treating people from twenty 
to twenty-  nine as young and redeﬁ  ning the prime age group accordingly 
(thirty to ﬁ  fty-  four). The results are shown in table 9.4 and are consistent 
with those in table 9.3.
The results shown in table 9.5 exploit the regional variations available in 
Table 9.3  Estimates of the direct eﬀect (older [55] workers labor force participation)
Levels 5- year  diﬀerences
    Coeﬃcient   SE   R2   Coeﬃcient   SE   R2
Covariates: GDP per capita, GDP growth, % manufactures
Employment young 0.809 0.301 0.738 –0.477 0.284 0.338
Unemployment young 0.298 0.329 0.888 0.618 0.292 0.325
Students –1.981 0.350 0.964 –0.171 0.365 0.287
Employment prime 0.437 0.077 0.988 –0.271 0.077 0.679
Unemployment prime –0.609 0.127 0.918 0.422 0.063 0.6346
No covariates
Employment young 1.061 0.194 0.378 –0.378 0.282 0.058
Unemployment young –1.176 0.168 0.477 0.391 0.314 0.048
Students –1.736 0.370 0.311 0.108 0.346 0.006
Employment prime 0.195 0.265 0.014 –0.272 0.083 0.283
Unemployment prime  –0.900   0.052   0.911   0.354   0.084   0.289
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Spain. We estimate the previous models (in levels and in ﬁ  ve- year diﬀerences, 
with and without covariates) using information at the autonomous commu-
nities level. The results are consistent with the evidence reported previously. 
Once again, the evidence diﬀers depending on the set of results analyzed 
(levels versus ﬁ  ve- year diﬀerences), but the R2 values suggest a better ﬁ  t from 
the equation in levels. In this case, we can see that, regardless of the use of 
covariates, the evidence suggests a positive association between employment 
of the young and of prime age individuals and the labor force participation 
Table 9.4  Estimates of the direct eﬀect (older [55] workers labor force participation)
Levels 5- year  diﬀerences
    Coeﬃcient   SE   R2   Coeﬃcient   SE   R2
Covariates: GDP per capita, GDP growth, %manufactures
Employment young 0.734 0.194 0.896 –0.456 0.170 0.674
Unemployment young –0.143 0.260 0.905 0.611 0.190 0.517
Students –1.653 0.300 0.953 –0.359 0.397 0.146
Employment prime 0.425 0.074 0.991 –0.221 0.087 0.434
Unemployment prime –0.603 0.112 0.910 0.413 0.066 0.651
No covariates
Employment young 0.828 0.251 0.199 –0.548 0.178 0.220
Unemployment young –1.296 0.129 0.652 0.493 0.224 0.121
Students –1.271 0.261 0.324 –0.034 0.398 0.001
Employment prime 0.134 0.266 0.007 –0.184 0.088 0.131
Unemployment prime  –0.783   0.051   0.890   0.319   0.082   0.282
Notes: SE   standard  error.
Table 9.5  Estimates of the direct eﬀect (older [55] workers labor force participation) 
exploiting regional variation
Levels 5- year  diﬀerences
    Coeﬃcient   SE   R2   Coeﬃcient   SE   R2
Covariates: GDP per capita, GDP growth, %manufactures
Employment young 0.541 0.238 0.290 0.017 0.134 0.073
Unemployment young –0.460 0.093 0.541 0.044 0.120 0.047
Students –0.403 0.245 0.709 –0.150 0.127 0.042
Employment prime 0.534 0.063 0.889 0.060 0.044 0.035
Unemployment prime –0.343 0.099 0.486 –0.029 0.036 0.041
No covariates
Employment young 0.682 0.231 0.217 0.061 0.083 0.002
Unemployment young –0.618 0.139 0.280 –0.051 0.092 0.002
Students –0.737 0.174 0.127 –0.025 0.078 0.000
Employment prime 0.444 0.099 0.130 0.051 0.045 0.009
Unemployment prime  –0.434   0.101   0.429   –0.010   0.032   0.001
Note: See table 9.3 notes.284        Michele Boldrin, Pilar García-Gómez, and Sergi Jiménez-Martín
of the old. The same is true for the unemployment rates of these two age 
groups. Moreover, the percentage of students in the young group is also 
negatively associated with the labor force participation of the old.
9.6.2    Eﬀects from the Incentives to Retire
Table 9.6 presents the key result from the analysis both in levels and ﬁ  ve-
 year diﬀerences. First, results vary substantially depending of the speciﬁ  ca-
tion (levels or ﬁ  ve years diﬀerences). Second, the Ibar variable is much more 
signiﬁ  cant in the speciﬁ  cation in levels (with and without covariates). Third, 
in the speciﬁ  cation with covariates, the incentive variable works in the cor-
rect direction for the LFP of the old, and it is insigniﬁ  cant for the behavior 
of the young. On the other hand, in the speciﬁ  cation with no covariates, the 
eﬀect of the incentive variable indicates substitutability between the young 
and the old workers.
9.7    Conclusions
The Spanish pension system has witnessed relatively few changes during 
the period 1975 to 2005. In fact, only the changes in the pension formula 
introduced in 1985 are of some relevance. The recent reform (2002, further 
modiﬁ  ed in 2007) introduced some important changes, but the key ones are 
to be phased out during several years, and a very large fraction of the active 
Table 9.6  Estimates of the indirect eﬀect (coeﬃcients of the incentive variable I ¯)
Levels 5- year  diﬀerences
    Coeﬃcient   SE   R2   Coeﬃcient   SE   R2
Covariates: GDP per capita, GDP growth, %manufactures
LFP older –0.005 0.000 0.984 –0.006 0.004 0.228
Employment young –0.001 0.002 0.723 0.019 0.003 0.670
Unemployment young –0.002 0.002 0.888 –0.025 0.003 0.750
Students 0.010 0.002 0.953 0.003 0.004 0.2875
Employment prime –0.002 0.001 0.987 0.004 0.001 0.565
Unemployment prime 0.003 0.001 0.910 –0.004 0.002 0.398
No covariates
LFP older –0.002 0.000 0.286 –0.002 0.003 0.020
Employment young 0.002 0.001 0.104 0.011 0.004 0.214
Unemployment young –0.002 0.001 0.100 –0.012 0.005 0.207
Students 0.011 0.001 0.9176 0.008 0.003 0.138
Employment prime 0.005 0.001 0.462 0.001 0.001 0.010
Unemployment prime  0.002   0.000   0.269   –0.001   0.002   0.010
Notes: Deﬁ  nitions of population groups: young   20–24; prime   25–54; ERA   earle retirement age; 
older   55 . Assumptions:     2.5 and     1, pre-  ERA wealth is set to zero and combining exit routes. 
SE   standard error; LFP   labor force participation.Social Security Incentives, Exit from Workforce, and Entry of the Young    2 8 5
workers can still retire under the 1997 rules. This is particularly true for the 
change in the ERA (from sixty to sixty-  one).
The most important changes have been the increase in the generosity of 
both the minimum and survival pensions, and the introduction (in 1990) 
of noncontributive pensions. However, these changes only aﬀect the low-
  skilled workers, which are, in practice, scarcely substitutable by younger, 
and usually much more educated, workers. The pension incentives faced by 
the average and high earners, who are relatively more substitutable by the 
educated young, have remained relatively stable since 1985.
This deﬁ  nes a context of “unimportant” reforms (except, perhaps, for the 
2006/2007 changes that we cannot study), which severely limits the varia-
tion in data. Either for this reason or because there is actually no correla-
tion whatsoever between the two variables, we have found only some (very 
weak) evidence of a positive relationship between the employment level of 
the young and the exit from the labor force of older workers.
An interesting potential avenue for further analysis may be the consider-
ation of the regional dimension of the Spanish labor market, which is likely 
to introduce substantial additional variation in the data.
Appendix
The Spanish Pension System since 1985
The rules governing the old age and survivors pensions in the RGSS in 
1985 are described in the following. The changes introduced by the 1997 
reform (R97) and the 2002 (A02) amendment will be illustrated as we go 
along. A summary of the basic technical aspects of the pre-   and post-  1997 
systems can be found in table 9A.2.
Financing and Eligibility
The RGSS is a pure pay- as- you- go scheme. Contributions are a ﬁ  xed pro-
portion of covered earnings, deﬁ  ned as total earnings, excluding payments 
for overtime work, between a ﬂ  oor and a ceiling that vary by broadly deﬁ  ned 
professional categories. Currently, eleven categories are distinguished, each 
one with its own ceiling and ﬂ  oor for covered earnings. The current RGSS 
contribution rate is 28.3 percent, of which 23.6 percent is attributed to the 
employer and the remaining 4.7 percent to the employee. A tax rate of 14 
percent is levied on earnings from overtime work.
Entitlement to an old age pension requires at least ﬁ  fteen years of contri-
butions. As a general rule, recipiency is conditional on having reached age 
sixty- ﬁ   ve  and  is  incompatible  with  income  from  any  kind  of  employment 
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Beneﬁ  t Computation
When eligibility conditions are met, a retiring worker receives an initial 
monthly pension, Pt, equal to
Pt    nBRt,
where the beneﬁ  t base (base reguladora) BRt is a weighted average of covered 
monthly earnings over a reference period that consists of the last eight years 
before retirement until the 1997 reform. Therefore, the BRt using eight years 


















where Wt–j and It–j are earnings and the consumer price index in the jth month 
before retirement. Pensions are paid in fourteen annual installments, hence 
the division by 112 in the previous formula. The replacement rate  n depends 
on the age of the retirees and on the number of years of contribution. When 
age is below sixty,  n   0 for all n. For age equal or greater than sixty-  ﬁ  ve, 
 n is equal to
   0,  if  n   15,
   n   
 .6   .02(n   15),  if  15   n   35.
   1,  if  35    n.
In the case of early retirement, that is, for ages between sixty and sixty-
 ﬁ  v e ,    n is determined by the previous formula multiplied by a penalization 
factor. The latter is equal to 0.60 at sixty, and increases of .08 each year, until 
reaching the value of 1.0 at age sixty-  ﬁ  ve.


















Beginning in 1997, the number of reference years used for computing BRt 
has been increased by one every year until 2003, to reach a total of ﬁ  fteen 
years. The formula for computing  n has been changed to the following:
 0,  if  n   15
 .5    .03(n   15),  if  15   n   25
   n     .8    .02(n   25),  if  25   n   35
 1,  if  35    n.
The penalization factors have, basically, remained the same, with an ex-
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in the next subsection). The A02 amendment allows for the possibility of  n 
being greater that one when people are above sixty-  ﬁ  ve years of age, that is,
 n   1   .02(a    65),  if  65    a and n   35.
Outstanding pensions are fully indexed to price inﬂ  ation, as measured 
by the consumer price index. Until 1986, pensions were also indexed to real 
wage growth.
Early Retirement
The normal retirement age is sixty-  ﬁ  ve but early retirement at age sixty 
is permitted under fairly common circumstances (sixty-  one from the 2002 
reform, but phased out to those who have not contributed before January, 
1 1967). The replacement rate for early retirees is reduced by 8 percentage 
points for each year under age sixty-  ﬁ  ve. Starting from 1997, workers who 
retire after the age of sixty with forty or more contributive years are charged 
a penalty of only 7 percent for each year under age sixty-  ﬁ  ve. The 2002 
amendment has modiﬁ  ed further the rules determining the replacement rate. 
It now reads as follows:
  0, if  a   61
   n   
 1   κ(a   60),  if  61   a   65
 1,  if  65    a,
where
  0.08 if  n   30,
 0.075  if  31    n   34
 κ     
 0.07  if  35   n   37
 0.065  if  38    n   39
 0.06  if  40    n.
Unless a collective labor agreement prescribes mandatory retirement, 
individuals may continue working after age sixty-  ﬁ  ve. Before 2002 there 
were no incentives to work past age sixty- ﬁ  ve. As mentioned, the 2002 legis-
lation now allows for:
   n   1   .02(a    65),  if  65    a and n   35
and eliminates social security contributions for workers meeting the eligi-
bility criteria for full normal retirement (a   65 and n   35) and who con-
tinue working. About 10 percent of the workers enrolled in the RGSS are 
actually exempt from reduction in the replacement rate in case of early retire-
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Maximum and Minimum Pension
Pensions are subject to a ceiling, legislated annually and roughly equal 
to the ceiling on covered earnings. The 2000 ceiling corresponds to about 
4.3 times the minimum wage (salario mínimo interprofesional, or SMI) and 
about 1.6 times the average monthly earnings in the manufacturing and 
service sectors. If the initial old age pension, computed as in the preceding, 
is below a minimum, then the minimum pension is paid. The latter is also 
legislated annually. Other things being equal, minimum pensions are higher 
for those who are older than sixty-  ﬁ  ve or have a dependent spouse.
In Spain, the annual value of the minimum guaranteed is discretionarily 
chosen by the government. In 2005, 2.25 millions of contributory pensions 
topped up (which represents 28.4 percent of all pensions (21.7 percent 
in RGSS and 38 percent of RETA, 28.2 percent of all old age pensions 
(36.5 percent of widowhood). The percentage of RGSS retirees receiving 
a minimum pension has been declining steadily, from over 75 percent in 
the late 1970s to 27 percent in 1995. The ratio between the minimum old 
age pension and the minimum wage has been increasing steadily from the 
late 1970s (it was 75 percent in 1975) until reaching almost 100 percent in 
the early 1990s. In 2007, the ratio of the minimum beneﬁ  t for pensioners 
above  65 (with a dependant spouse) to the minimum wage was 108, or 92 
percent of the average pension. The real rate of growth of the minimum 
pension in 1990/2007 was 1.1 percent and 3.86 in the ﬁ  rst term of Zapatero, 
2004/2007.
Minimum pensions are also very popular for their redistributive proper-
ties: “atendiendo al principio de solidaridad que inspira la redistribución 
de rentas en el sistema de seguridad social español, los mecanismos esta-
blecidos son la garantía de pensión mínima en la esfera contributiva y las 
pensiones no contributivas” (Spanish Ministry of Labor and Social Aﬀairs 
2005).
Family Considerations
A pensioner receives a ﬁ  xed annual allowance for each dependent child 
that is younger than 18 or disabled. In 2000, this allowance was equal to 
48,420 pesetas for each child under 18, and to 468,720 pesetas (45 percent 
of the annualized minimum wage) for each disabled child.
Survivors (spouse, children, and other relatives) may receive a fraction of 
the beneﬁ  t base of the deceased if the latter was a pensioner or died before 
retirement after contributing for at least 500 days in the last ﬁ  ve years. The 
surviving spouse gets 45 percent of the beneﬁ  t base of the deceased (46 
percent after the 2002 amendment, a fraction that will be increased further 
in the forthcoming years). Such pension is compatible with labor income 
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Each of the surviving children gets 20 percent of the beneﬁ  t base until the 
age of eighteen (amount raised to 23 percent in 1997). An orphan who is 
sole beneﬁ  ciary may receive up to 65 percent of the beneﬁ  t base. If there are 
several surviving children, the sum of the pensions to the surviving spouse 
(if any) and the children cannot exceed 100 percent of the beneﬁ  t base.
A Spanish peculiarity is the “pension in favor of family members.” This 
pension entitles other surviving relatives (e.g., parents, grandparents, sib-
lings, nephews, etc.) to 20 percent of the beneﬁ  t base of the principal if 
they satisfy certain eligibility conditions (older than forty-  ﬁ  ve, do not have 
a spouse, do not have other means of subsistence, have been living with and 
depending economically upon the deceased for the last two years). To this 
pension, one may add the 45 percent survivors pension if there is no surviv-
ing spouse or eligible surviving children.
Rules for the Self-  Employed
In this section, we sketch the main diﬀerences between the RGSS and the 
RETA. Beside diﬀerences in the Social Security tax rate and the deﬁ  nition 
of covered earnings, the people aﬃliated to RETA and who are not miners 
or sailors have no early retirement option.
While the Social Security tax rate is the same for the RETA and the general 
scheme (28.3 percent in 2000), covered earnings are computed diﬀerently, 
as the self-  employed are essentially free to choose their covered earnings 
between a ﬂ  oor and a ceiling legislated annually. Not surprisingly, in light 
of the strong progressivity of Spanish personal income taxes, a suspiciously 
large proportion of self-  employed workers report earnings equal to the leg-
islated ﬂ  oor until they reach about age ﬁ  fty to ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve. After that age, one 
observes a sudden increase in reported covered earnings. This behaviors 
exploits the “ﬁ  nite memory” in the formula for the calculation of the initial 
pension and appears to be fading after the 1997 legislation increased the 
number of years used in that calculation from eight to ﬁ  fteen.
A crucial diﬀerence with respect to the general scheme is that, under the 
RETA, recipiency of an old age pension is compatible with maintaining the 
self-  employed status. Other important provisions are the following: RETA 
only requires ﬁ  ve years of contributions in the ten years immediately before 
the death of the principal in order to qualify for survivors pensions. Under 
RETA, the latter is 50 percent of the beneﬁ  t base. If the principal was not a 
pensioner at the time of death, the beneﬁ  t base is computed as the average 
of covered earnings over an uninterrupted period of ﬁ  ve years chosen by the 
beneﬁ  ciary among the last ten years before the death of the principal.
Rules for Central Government Employees (RCP)
We now describe brieﬂ  y the main diﬀerences between the general scheme 
and the RCP, the pension fund for the employees of the central government. Social Security Incentives, Exit from Workforce, and Entry of the Young    2 9 3
Public servants are divided into ﬁ  ve categories, labeled from A to E, corre-
sponding loosely to decreasing school levels: A for college graduates, B for 
people holding certain kinds of college diplomas, C for high school gradu-
ates, D for junior high school diplomas, and E for individuals with lower 
education levels. For each of these categories, the budget law deﬁ  nes every 
year a theoretical Social Security wage, which is used to compute Social 
Security contributions and pensions. The implied wage scale has remained 
relatively constant since 1985. The top to bottom ratio never exceeded 2.5.
The basic monthly pension of a public servant who retires in month t 
after contributing for n years to RCP is computed as Pt    nBRt, where the 
dependence of  n upon the numbers of years worked has changed frequently 
over time. For n   15, the last table of proportionality factors, legislated in 
1990, can be reasonably (but not exactly) approximated by:
 n   min[1, 1   0.0366(35   n)].
The diﬀerences with respect to the general scheme are various. First, while 
the entitlement to a pension still requires at least ﬁ  fteen years of contribu-
tions, the replacement rate (the ratio of the pension to the beneﬁ  t base) 
increases somewhat irregularly with seniority up to 100 percent after thirty-
 ﬁ  v e   y e a r s.   S o ,   f o r   e x a m p l e ,   ﬁ  f t e e n   y e a r s   o f   s e r v i c e   g i v e   r i g h t   t o   a   p e n s i o n  
equal to only 26.92 percent of the beneﬁ  t base, against 60 percent of the 
general scheme. After thirty years, the same ratio has increased to 81.73 
percent, against 90 percent for the general scheme.
Second, the beneﬁ  t base is computed as a weighted average of covered 
earnings upon which the worker paid the contributions, with weights equal 
to the percentage of the career spent at each level, that is,
BRt   ∑
i
 piHit,
where pi is the fraction of the career spent on level i and Hit are the cov-
ered earnings corresponding to level i, as determined by the current law at 
time t.
Third, unlike the general scheme, the RCP imposes mandatory retirement 
at age sixty-  ﬁ  ve. Exceptions are made for a few special categories, such as 
university professors and judges. On the other hand, the RCP allows for early 
retirement at the age of sixty, without any penalty for public servants with 
at least thirty years of service (twenty for military personnel).
A fourth important diﬀerence with respect to the general scheme is com-
patibility between RCP pension recipiency and income from continuing to 
work. In a number of special cases, RCP pensioners are allowed to keep 
a public-  sector occupation, as long as this does not provide them with a 
“regular ﬂ  ow of income” (for example, this is the case of members of legis-
lative bodies). More important, the legislation allows RCP pensions to be 
cumulated with earnings from employment in the private sector.294        Michele Boldrin, Pilar García-Gómez, and Sergi Jiménez-Martín
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